(a) Background (b) Features (c) Comparison (e) Gainers + Losers (f) Recommendations (g) Options |
3.5.3 Forest Estate Management[1] The current systems of management described above are changing as a result of the impasse with the concession system and the introduction of new systems after the restructuring of the Forestry Administration as set out in the Forestry Law. Our understanding of the new and emerging system of forest management follows, which we have labelled “Forest Estate Management”.
This new approach primarily, but not entirely affects commercial logging and provides an alternative to the concession system. The arrangements for community forestry, plantations and, of course, illegal and informal logging activities remain as described in Section A above.
Since September 2003 and the finalisation of the Prakas on the reorganisation of the Department of Forestry and Wildlife to a Forestry Administration, a new model for forest management in Cambodia has been emerging.
Although we are presenting Forest Estate Management as a new model, there is a sense in which it is already the current model. The arrangements are clearly set out in the Forestry Law; the concession system is still in operation although, in practice, it is no longer functioning
The Forest Estate Management model is an integral part and indistinguishable from the new FA structure and remit, covers all aspects of the sector. In theory, it could operate through the concession system, but in practice, the new systems being develop include alternative approaches to concessions – it should not therefore be considered as merely a replacement for the concession system, as it represents a wider set of changes. As an approach, it includes demarcating estate boundaries and regulating all activity within the boundaries. The organisational changes are to enable the FA to fulfil this remit.
(b) Features of Forest Estate Management The Forest Estate Management can be considered as a response to the difficulties encountered managing a public-private partnership and trying to regulate this without having control over staff resources. The main organisational characteristics are as follows:
In addition to this fundamental change in organisation, there are also significant changes in the planning framework. Some of these have already been described in the Forestry Law but the actual form and levels are only now being clarified. The important features of the planning framework are:
In order to implement this ambitious restructuring there are significant requirements for resources both in terms of infrastructure (offices, vehicles, communications) and developing the capabilities of staff to perform their technical and managerial duties.
The policy rationale for this reorganisation is the bringing together of the line of control to ensure that accountability and responsibility go together. The FA would be responsible for its own strategic planning, operational planning and implementation rather than contracting these out to private companies or individuals. A state controlled system would be more likely to take a long-term view of resource utilisation rather than being driven by the short-term imperatives witnessed under the concession system. However, the approach gives the FA territorial mandate and, in the absence of any mechanisms for citizens to have a voice in decision-making, this is likely to create the same clash over rights and entitlements as occurred between concessionaire and communities. Hence, we have used the term “forest estate management” to characterise the approach.
The two approaches (concession system and forest estate management) are similar in the sense that they are both centrally regulated systems with management contracted out to the private sector under the concession system and devolved with the public sector under the forest estate management system (Figure 9).
In practice, under both systems, field operations are undertaken by sub-contractors. Under the concession system, the relationship between the concessionaire and the sub-contractor is that of a “next-in-line” supplier, with the subcontractor supplying a purchaser who has incentives to maximise supply and, therefore, no incentive to regulate or control the sources of supply. Under the forest estate management system, the same contractors will be involved. However, the FA will organise coupes on a smaller scale and, therefore, create conditions more suited to smaller contractors, and, secondly, auction the coupes through a competitive bidding system. Such systems are not easy to run, but they do create a point of disconnect at which a contract has to be negotiated between the FA and contractor, and, therefore, the opportunity to exclude those who break the rules.
(d) Advantages and disadvantages
The advantage of the system now being advocated and adopted by the FA is that it allows the State to move away from a concession system and to demonstrate its capacity to control forest resource use. It increases linear and vertical accountability but not accountability downwards to local people. It has delegated planning but not decision-making closer to people by the delegation to the division level of sectoral planning and management planning within an overall cantonment framework. It will improve the bureaucratic status of the organisation and clarify (on the ground) its responsibilities for the forest resource and help to remove some of the current ambiguities around this. With the shift of staff to the front-line and the movement of the front-line down towards the commune in some cases, it should also help to inform and clarify local peoples’ rights over forest resources. It will increase the ability of the organisation to resist unwanted external pressures and influences; and centralised control over staff.
Revenue collection should, in theory, be easier with clearer structures for accountability and flows of revenue, although the system totally internalises the processes with no mechanisms for checking probity.
The major disadvantage of this system is that it sets up the Forestry Administration as ‘estate managers’ or ‘landlords’ with complete control over the territory that lies within their demarcated boundaries. This, in reality, creates a new claim and/or replaces a private sector claim with a central state claim – without cognizance of other customary claims, and is, therefore, subject to the same conflict as before.
Furthermore, in practice, given the areas involved and the limited resources available to FA, it will be difficult to exercise that degree of control and will, therefore, create an opportunity for others to exploit the area, without sustainable management.
Finally, the proposed new structure has a fundamental flaw in that there are no or few checks and balances. In particular, there is no separation of functions so that regulatory and planning functions are contained within the same organisation and within the same unit within the organisation. Effectively, this means that the proposer (or planner) is also the approver (or regulator) of those plans and activities. The provision of regional inspectorates does provide an opportunity to separate the regulatory roles from the implementation by removing the inspectorates from the line of command between the centre and the cantonments. However, this is not currently proposed by the FA.
The structure is at variance with the government position on decentralisation[2], reinforcing centralised rather than decentralised structures. There are no public accountability mechanisms suggested and no independent process through which local people can seek redress against decisions made by the Forest Administration that may have an adverse impact on them. The main lines of accountability are vertical and internal to the organisation as is consistent with a centralised structure that has deconcentrated and not decentralised powers. There are no horizontal connections to provinces or downward accountability to commune councils, communities or users, within whose boundaries these forest resources occur.
The generalised provision of a wide range of services at the triage level means that the effectiveness of the FA as a whole is dependent on the quality of performance of staff at this level and the support provided to their development. There are significant problems of capacity development recognised and identified by staff to be overcome. This will require funding and on-going support to develop the necessary skills. In addition, the triage effectively becomes an arena for competition between activities, with the dangers that ‘commercial’ aspects of forest management to do with operation of the annual coupes will drive staff work programmes rather than the community forestry or other advisory work.
The extension of the state forestry apparatus down to the commune itself can be seen both as an advantage and disadvantage. Experience elsewhere indicates that the lower the level of State operation the greater the opportunity for rent-seeking, particularly when there are no public accountability mechanisms.
The changes envisaged under this restructuring are profound. There is however, no budget to support the depth of change required at all levels and to build the human resource and organisational base of the FA. It is not clear that either donors or national government will be prepared to provide the level of finance required to fully implement and empower the FA.
Since the FA structure has just been introduced after many years of internal debate which resulted in the changes being seen as a requirement of Government and others, it will be more difficult to challenge and change this structure in any radical way.
The major gainer from the emerging Forest Estate Management system is the Forestry Administration which has effectively set itself up to perform this function. It provides the FA with a clear remit and control over the resources required to regulate and manage the forest. It enables the FA to be held accountable for activities in the forest sector.
The capacity for staff to extract rents from the resource could also increase under this structure as there is no external oversight or accountability mechanism. This, together with the increased presence of staff on the ground, may increase their individual opportunities for rent-seeking. However, the changes are an essential first step towards regulatory control.
The forest resource should come under more effective protection with the greater outreach and visibility of staff at the triage level. However, this only holds true as long as grassroots incentives to cut the forests are controlled and the collusion between the powerful players stops.
In theory, there should be greater contribution to the national economy through revenue flow from the annual coupes and from benefit-sharing through community forestry.
The major losers under this scenario are those business-people interested in forest concessions and the large sub-contractors. In addition, the military will have more limited opportunities for activities in those areas coming under FA control. This will probably lead to a regrouping of the military and their increased presence in the exploitation of protected areas, if there is not a concurrent increase in their protection.
Local livelihoods may also lose out under this new regime, as the opportunities for ‘illegal’ exploitation are reduced because of the increased presence of FA staff at the local-level and more effective enforcement. Under increased support to community forestry there is a risk that the forest dependent livelihoods of poorer people will be threatened. Community forestry is often captured by the elites and this usually leads to complete exclusion of users from a resource. This may also lead to increased pressure on those forests that are not under commercial management (through the FA) or under community forestry arrangements.
Despite, the rationale and logic of the new arrangements, the evolving structure and processes of the FA seem counter to the policy commitments of government to decentralisation, increasing the role of the public in decision-making, and confirming rights to local resource management.
RECOMMENDATION We recommend:
· The current structure of the FA is split to separate the regulatory functions from the planning and management functions. We make specific suggestions for this in Chapter 4.
· Public accountability mechanisms are developed and implemented effectively
· Forest planning is developed around a landscape approach. This could serve both as a basis for building public accountability through representation mechanisms for provinces, districts and communes, as well as other concerned ministries. It could also act as the line of disconnect between (a) the planning of the landscape and (b) the approval and monitoring of the landscape plan and its implementation.
Further, capacity needs to be developed and resources allocated for:
(a) Preparation of strategic plans (National Forest Management Plan and Cantonment Plans); (b) Independent verification mechanisms and log tracking arrangements; (c) Provision of extension support to Community Forestry, including technical advice and social advice to build the voices of more marginal groups.
Additional financial and human resources will be required to develop an effective and efficient Forestry Administration
Before going on to consider a more radical decentralised arrangements for forest management, we considered a number of other institutional arrangements that could be put in place under the umbrella of Forest Estate Management. All of these depend on the prior set of discussions around the broad policy choices for forest management:
Option A. Existing new structure harmonisation within MAFF. This would require upgrading FA to a General Directorate within MAFF to ensure that it has a more effective voice within MAFF as part of the productive rural sector. Under this option, the regional inspectorates could be moved outside the line control of FA and become responsible for regulatory functions. The inspectorates would have a separate line of command and a distinct and separate mandate to inspect and regulate the performance of the FA and its staff under the jurisdiction of MAFF.
Option B. Attach the “triage level” to the Commune Councils or District level This would require the removal of staff and authority from the triage level of the FA and the transfer to the Commune Council or another ministry to manage and employ forestry staff. This would ensure the separation of functions between regulation and planning/support.
Option C. Downgrade the FA to a production management unit of MAFF This is similar to Option A and would mean that MAFF would become the strategic authority responsible for monitoring the implementation of policy and the Forestry Administration would become a unit responsible for implementation of policy solely around production forests
Although these options address the issue of the separation of regulatory and planning functions, they do not alter the equally fundamental issues of establishing “prior claims” and legitimising the current activities in the so-called grey areas. As a result, in addition to these restructuring options, we return in Chapter 4 to consider more fundamental institutional choices that can be made.
The choice of organisation structures depends on the earlier choice of how forests are to be managed. In the next section, we consider a radical proposal, which brings together much of the earlier analysis and would give communes a direct say in the management of forests. |
